BitLocker does not change what goes wrong with drives. An SSD's controller still fails, a hard disk's heads still degrade, sectors still go bad, and a file system still corrupts after a bad shutdown. When any of that happens to an encrypted drive, the problem is the hardware or the file system, exactly as it would be on an unencrypted drive, and it is solved the same way. The encryption sits on top, and matters only at the end, when the recovered data has to be decrypted.
That is why the recovery key or password is the hinge. With it, a failed BitLocker drive is recovered like any other: we stabilise and image it at the sector level behind a write blocker, working weak areas last and keeping a map of anything unreadable; a mechanically failed disk is repaired and read on the bench, a dead SSD controller read at the chip level. Then, on the image, never the original, we decrypt with your key and repair any file-system damage. The data comes back. Without the key, the drive can still be imaged, but the image cannot be opened unless one of the lost-key routes applies, so the first question is always whether you have the key.
The never-decrypt-in-place rule deserves emphasis because getting it wrong is how recoverable drives are lost. Decrypting a drive rewrites every sector as it goes; on a drive that is already failing, that sustained read-write load can be the thing that finishes it, and if it dies mid-decryption you may be left with neither the encrypted original nor a complete decrypted copy. Partial decryption of a damaged volume can also leave the file system in a worse state. Imaging first, and decrypting the image, removes that risk entirely: the original is read once, gently, and never written to, and all the work happens on a copy.